Different Strokes for Different Folks: Who Votes for Technocratic Parties? by Snegovaya, Maria
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463)
2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 556–567
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v8i4.3482
Article
Different Strokes for Different Folks: Who Votes for Technocratic Parties?
Maria Snegovaya
Kellogg Center for Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg,
VA 24061, USA; E-Mail: marias20@vt.edu
Submitted: 15 July 2020 | Accepted: 9 October 2020 | Published: 17 December 2020
Abstract
In this study, I look at two types of political actors commonly described as ‘populist’ in literature—namely, rightwing
populists and technocratic leaders like France’s Emmanuel Macron and the Czech Republic’s Andrej Babiš. While both
types of political actors tend to emerge as a response to a decline in trust in established parties and adopt platforms
with anti-establishment and monist elements, they also possess noticeably different qualities. Unlike rightwing populists,
technocrats lack a distinctive ideological profile and tend to adopt more inclusive rhetoric by appealing to a broadly-
defined community of people. When contrasted with supporters of rightwing populists, empirical analysis of supporters
of Macron’s and Babiš’ parties shows that the two have few commonalities. Relatively few examples of such political lead-
ership, the lack of a distinct ideological profile and the variation of their support bases suggest that one should use caution
when conceptualizing technocratic populists as a distinct theoretical type.
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1. Introduction
The increase of populist political leaders across theworld
in the last decade has attracted considerable attention in
political science literature (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013;
Panizza, 2005).
Despite the proliferation of varying types of populist
figures, recent studies have primarily paid attention to
rightwing populist parties in European countries, includ-
ing Alternative for Germany, UK Independence Party, and
France’s National Front (FN,more recently National Rally;
Ivaldi, 2018; Schmitt-Beck, 2017; Siri, 2018; Stockemer,
2017). A key defining feature of these parties is an
anti-elitist message and the use of a thin-centered pop-
ulist ideology which views their respective societies as
being in a state of constantManichean struggle between
the ‘people,’ whose interests they claim to represent,
and malevolent or corrupt elites (Mudde, 2004, 2007).
In recent years, scholars have also increasingly
paid attention to technocratic leaders, who adopt anti-
establishment appeals to reject the establishment poli-
tics on both sides of the political spectrum, while offer-
ing their own technocratic competence and expert solu-
tions to benefit the ‘people’ (Buštíková & Guasti, 2019;
Havlík, 2019; Heinisch & Saxonberg, 2017). Studies have
referred to the political leadership of Silvio Berlusconi
in Italy, Andrej Babiš in the Czech Republic, Emmanuel
Macron in France, Donald Trump in the United States,
Bidzina Ivanishvili in Georgia, and Rafael Correa in
Ecuador as examples of such political actors (Buštíková
& Guasti, 2019; de la Torre, 2013).
Despite the existence of substantive literature on
the rightwing populists and the profiles of their support
bases (Pauwels, 2014; Rooduijn, 2018), few studies have
focused on the comparison of these figures and techno-
cratic leaders. This article aims to fill that gap. In this
text, I focus on two countries, France and the Czech
Republic, as examples of nations where technocratic
leaders (Emmanuel Macron and Andrej Babiš) were elec-
torally successful in the last decade. I analyze similari-
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ties and differences between technocratic leaders and
rightwing populists in their respective countries (name-
ly, Marine Le Pen and Tomio Okamura). In this study,
I find that while all such leaders use anti-establishment
and monist appeals, the salience of populist elements in
their platforms varies quite dramatically. In contrast to
rightwing populists, technocratic leaders lack a distinc-
tive ideological profile and offer a broader, more inclu-
sive vision of the community of people whose interests
they claim to represent, as opposed to a more exclu-
sive nativist vision of ‘the people’ that is offered by
rightwing populists.
In addition, I also find that the parties led by these
politicians tend to attract vastly different electorates.
Using the European Social Survey (ESS) data, I com-
pare voters of these parties in their respective coun-
tries. The results show that while Le Pen’s FN and
Okamura’s Freedom and Direct Democracy attract sim-
ilar social groups from lower socioeconomic strata, as
well as voters with Eurosceptic, anti-establishment and
anti-immigration attitudes, supporters of the parties led
by Macron and Babiš tend to cut across class lines, dif-
fer in their positions on Euroscepticism and immigra-
tion, and have higher (rather than lower) levels of insti-
tutional trust. Therefore, being distinctly different from
supporters of rightwing populist parties, the electorates
of La Republique en Marche! (LaREM) and ANO 2011
(Action of Dissatisfied Citizens) have few commonalities
between each other, if any.
Relatively few examples of such political leadership,
lack of a distinct ideological profile, and variation of their
support groups suggests that one should use caution
when conceptualizing technocratic populists as a distinct
theoretical type.
2. Commonalities between Rightwing and Technocratic
Populists
The most widely accepted definition of populism focus-
es on its tendency to assign a binary moral dimension
to political conflicts by drawing a Manichean distinc-
tion between the ‘good people’ and the ‘bad elites’
(Hawkins, 2009, 2010; Mudde, 2004, 2007; Mudde &
Kaltwasser, 2017). Populists, therefore, are monists in
the sense that they tend to conceive of society as a
singular unitary body (Canovan, 1981; Taggart, 2004).
Populists are ‘people-centrist’ in that they argue that the
will of the people should be the point of departure for
all political decision-making and claim to represent the
‘people,’ a vaguely-defined homogeneous entity which
could refer to a nation, ethnic group, culture, religion,
civilization, etc. (Müller, 2016; Rooduijn, 2018; Taggart,
2000). Populists are also anti-establishment—that is,
they accuse the ‘elite’ of being incompetent or corrupt
(Barr, 2009; Canovan, 2002). Paradoxically, rising to pow-
er and becoming members of the elite themselves does
not dissuade populists from using this rhetoric. When
in power, populists continue to use anti-elite appeals to
demobilize and delegitimize their opponents (Buštíková
& Guasti, 2019).
The thin nature of the populist ideology allows it to
combine with additional ideological elements (Mudde &
Kaltwasser, 2017; Zulianello, 2020). As a result, scholars
often find ‘populist’ parties on both sides of the politi-
cal spectrum.
In recent years, scholarship has devoted particular
attention to a broad category of rightwing populists.
In the past, radical right populists used to be selected as a
separate conceptual category, yet in recent years, many
of these figures have moderated their previously radical
stances on ethnicminorities and immigration (Héjj, 2017;
Mondon, 2017). As a result, their platforms became less
extremist, and now they are often grouped together in
one conceptual category with national-conservative pop-
ulists and radicalized mainstream politicians (Zulianello,
2020). The key commonality across all these actors is that
they tend to combine their populist anti-establishment
overtones with nativism, an ideology which holds that
states should be inhabited exclusively by members of
the native group and that non-native elements (persons
and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homoge-
nous nation-state (Mudde, 2007, p. 19; Mudde, 2010).
In their populist appeals, rightwing populists often
rhetorically intertwine the defense of ‘the people’ with
the defense of an ethnicity, culture, or nation (Jenne,
2018; Vachudova, 2020). For example, in the Czech
Republic, Tomio Okamura’s rightwing populist party
Dawn of Direct Democracy has politicized the divide
between the ‘citizens’ and the elites. The party received
almost 7% in the 2013 parliamentary election vote;
however, in 2015, the party split and several of its
members, including Okamura, founded a new political
party dubbed Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD).
In the 2017 parliamentary elections, the SPD entered
the Chamber of Deputies with the fourth result. In his
public speeches, Okamura portrays himself as the ulti-
mate guardian of the ‘will of the people’ while attacking
the alleged enemies of the ‘people’—that is, mainstream
Czech politicians, mainstream media, and the European
Union (Chovanec, 2020). His party’s platform describes
political elites in the Czech Republic as “godfather par-
ty mafias” and offers removal of established politicians
as the solution for the country’s problems (Úsvit přímé
demokracie, 2013). These populist appeals are mixed
with explicitly nativist overtones through an emphasis on
the threat of immigrants allegedly taking away Czech cit-
izens’ jobs, as shown by the slogan “support to families,
not to unadaptables. Work to our [people], not to immi-
grants” (Kim, 2020).
Similarly, another rightwing populist, a leader of
the FN, Marine Le Pen, presents herself as “the voice
of the people, the spirit of France” and the represen-
tative of the French “honest and hard-working peo-
ple” who are governed by “corrupt elites” (Stockemer
& Barisione, 2017). The populist overtones of these
appeals have a distinctly anti-establishment and nativist
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element. The FN advances an exclusionist, ethno-cultural
conception of the people by portraying immigration as a
“threat to national identity” and a burden for the French
welfare system and finances. This threat, according to
the FN, calls for the enforcement of “national priority”
(Ivaldi, Lanzone, & Woods, 2017). In the 2012 and 2017
parliamentary elections, the FN won 13.6% and 13.2%
of votes respectively, and in the 2017 French presiden-
tial election, Marine Le Pen made it to the presiden-
tial runoff.
The second group, technocratic leaders, also portray
the society as being in a state of a Manichean struggle
between the ‘bad elites’ and the ‘good people’ whose
interests they claim to represent. However, instead of
nativist ideology, these leaders employ a more inclu-
sive vision of ‘the people’ and combine populist appeals
to ordinary people with promises to resolve societal
problems through their own technocratic competence
(Havlík, 2019). Andrej Babiš in the Czech Republic and
Emmanuel Macron in France are often used as examples
of such political leadership (Buštíková & Guasti, 2019;
Havlík, 2019; Maynard & Lahdelma, 2018).
These leaders tend to marry technocracy with pop-
ulism by creating an anti-establishment and anti-elitism
rhetoric which combines attacks on the corruption of the
established parties with technocratic promises that tar-
get the inability of established parties to deliver in terms
of governance (Bickerton & Accetti, 2018; Buštíková
& Guasti, 2019; Guasti, 2020). Both Andrej Babiš and
Emmanuel Macron emphasize their technocratic creden-
tials as a tool to solve the challenges faced by their
respective societies. Babiš, for example, has repeatedly
stressed that he does not trust traditional politics, and
has advocated for a different, managerial approach to
politics where ministers are experts rather than career
politicians. Babiš portrays himself as an outsider of the
system, that is, not a politician, but an amicable, philan-
thropic manager who knows how to care for those in his
charge (Engler, Pytlas, & Deegan-Krause, 2019; Kopeček,
2016). Babiš’ party ANO2011 has fiercely criticized estab-
lished political parties for the alleged corrupt behav-
ior of their representatives (Havlík, 2019). ANO offered
to “make everything better for the ordinary people”
through an “expert and businesslike” governance style
which runs “the state as a firm” (Buštíková & Guasti,
2019; Guasti & Buštíková, 2020). High salience of anti-
corruption and anti-elitism distinguished ANO from oth-
er Czech parties (Havlík, 2019) and helped it become the
most successful Czech political party since the fall of com-
munism. Notably, ANO received about 19% and 30% of
the vote in the 2013 and the 2017 elections.
Another example of technocratic leadership is
France’s Emmanuel Macron, who achieved a landslide
victory in the 2017 presidential elections by receiv-
ing 66.1% of the vote. His party LaREM subsequently
secured a majority in the French legislative elections.
Macron’s program can be described as populist, espe-
cially given his continuous portrayal of French society
as being divided into two camps—the backward-looking
conservatives and the progressive reformers. He makes
an explicit connection between national sovereignty
and reclaimed agency for ordinary people (Fougère &
Barthold, 2020). Macron’s populist rhetoric disqualified
the two traditional (left and right) ruling parties as part
of the failed, old-guard elites, while portraying him-
self as an outsider of the system and emphasizing the
“modest backgrounds” his parents came from (Macron,
2017, p. 17). Macron has also described himself as a
political leader who is uniquely capable, through the
expert knowledge he gained working as a Minister of
Economy under former president François Hollande, to
address problems facing the French people. While in
power, Macron continued using populist appeals, claim-
ing to defend his expert decision-making on behalf
of the peoples’ interests against those of the illegiti-
mate, imprudent elites on the other side of the soci-
ety (Perottino & Guasti, 2020). These anti-establishment
tones were also reflected in Macron’s En Marche! move-
ment, which subsequently transformed into the political
party La Republique en Marche! Upon its founding, con-
sistent with Macron’s anti-establishment discourse, the
party did not accept members of other political parties
or established politicians. Instead, LaREMwas comprised
of local online-constituted committees with no formal
hierarchy (Fougère & Barthold, 2020). Subsequently, the
salience of anti-elite themes remained high for LaREM in
comparison to most other French parties (except FN and
Unbowed France; Perottino & Guasti, 2020).
Direct ideological appeals to ‘the people’ over the
heads of ‘the discredited elites’ is the key reason why
political leaders as different as Tomio Okamura, Marine
Le Pen, Andrej Babiš and EmmanuelMacron are ‘lumped’
together as populists. However, rather than being an end
in itself, these appeals often reflect the current crisis
within political systems fromwhich these politicians tend
to emerge. Anti-establishment sentiment flourishes in
an atmosphere of declining political trust, critical evalu-
ation of political parties, and negative attitudes toward
politicians and politics in general (Kriesi, 2018). Studies
have found a direct link between policy convergence of
the political mainstream and a subsequent emergence
of populist parties that offer alternative policy options
(Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997;
Meguid, 2005). Failure of mainstream parties to truly
represent the interests of their voters erodes their own
support, decreases satisfactionwith democracy, and con-
tributes to the electoral success of populists (Caiani &
Graziano, 2019; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015). The populist
platforms of the rising challengers that emphasize their
appeal to ‘ordinary people’ over the allegedly corrupt
or malevolent elites is often a natural response to the
existing dissatisfaction of their voters with the politi-
cal establishment.
All of these parties and leaders, therefore, tend to
come to power in an atmosphere of declining trust in
established parties. Since populists are a response to
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popular dissatisfactionwith politicalmainstream, it is not
surprising that electoral successes of technocrats and
rightwing populists go hand in hand—both reflect vot-
ers’ dissatisfaction with traditional politics. For example,
the rise of Macron in France occurred amidst a growing
distrust of political leaders and institutions, which fueled
the rise of populist parties and drove voter abstention to
unprecedented levels (Chamorel, 2019). The emergence
ofMacron coincidedwith a surge in popularity ofMarine
Le Pen, with whom he competed in the runoff of the
2017 presidential elections. Macron’s 2017 election vic-
tory was, to a large extent, a function of his outsider
status, the collapse of the traditional political establish-
ment, and the rejection of Le Pen’s rightwing populism.
Similarly, in the Czech Republic, ANO’s success in the
2013 and 2017 parliamentary elections coincided with
the rise of the Dawn/SPD.
However, while studies have paid particular atten-
tion to rightwing populist parties in the context of
their responses to widespread disillusionment with the
country’s ruling elite and claims to restore respon-
siveness in the political system, few have analyzed a
second type—the technocratic populist response and
characteristics of their support bases (Caramani, 2017;
Dargent, 2015).
3. Differences between Rightwing and Technocratic
Populists
Similarities in these leaders’ discourse should not con-
ceal critical differences between rightwing populists
and technocrats.
First, technocratic leaders are often described as
non-ideological, “ideologically unfocused” (Havlík, 2019),
or ideologically “thin” (Buštíková & Guasti, 2019). This
vagueness is strategic in so far as it enables these leaders
to overcome the left-right divide and combine a broad
variety of policies across both sides of the political spec-
trum (Guasti, 2020). Unconstrained by the need of ide-
ological consistency, technocrats have the flexibility to
choose from a wide array of policies, including both
redistributive and/or neoliberal policies (Guasti, 2020).
In recent years, for example, ANO, a party that original-
ly embraced neoliberal policies consistent with Babiš’s
self-portrayal as a businessman, hasmoved to the left on
economy and has used targeted welfare policies to buy
off segments of the electorate. Ideological vagueness like
this makes it harder to classify these political actors into
one homogeneous party family.
ANO, for instance, comes up ideologically short in
comparison to many ideologically-driven rightwing pop-
ulist parties (Hanley & Vachudova, 2018). Babiš is primar-
ily a pragmatic businessman, that is, a manager rather
than a politician, whose idea of effective governing is to
run the country like a company (Pehe, 2018). This made
some scholars reluctant to classify ANO as a populist par-
ty (Engler et al., 2019). Similarly, Macron’s 2017 electoral
campaign adopted a deliberate ideological vagueness
by describing himself as “both rightwing and left-wing”
(Fougère & Barthold, 2020). To preserve this ideologi-
cal ambiguity, Macron even delayed publishing his elec-
toral programuntil less than two months before the pres-
idential election. This delay made some observers argue
that “it is inconceivable that candidates for the high-
est office in any other major democracy would express
themselves [so vaguely]” (Fougère & Barthold, 2020;
Hazareesingh, 2017), while making some question to
what extent Macron could be described as a populist
(Jones, 2017).
Second, unlike rightwing populists, technocrats do
not define ‘the people’ in strictly nativist terms. In con-
trast to rightwing populists, they adopt more inclusive
rhetoric by appealing to a broadly defined community
of people.
Andrej Babiš’ discourse, for example, does not
describe the Czech Republic in nativist terms. Instead, it
presents the country as a land of people who are excep-
tional for their diligence, extraordinary manual skills,
brightness, and wit (Havlík, 2019). ANO defines itself as
a party for everyone that cross-cuts existing cleavages
(Buštíková & Guasti, 2019). Similarly, Macron’s 2017 elec-
toral rhetoric cut across partisan, ethnic, and religious
lines by offering a broader notion of community and
attempting to “bring together people from the left, cen-
ter and right who want to work together” (Fougère &
Barthold, 2020). Macron criticized Marine Le Pen, a lead-
er of the rightwing populist FN party, for her adoption of
divisive “hate-filled speeches” towards minorities, while
portraying himself as being more inclusive of all French
people (Cuny, 2017).
4. Variation across Electorates
As a result of these important differences, rightwing pop-
ulists and technocrats should attract supporters who,
while all dissatisfied with mainstream politics, represent
different social groups, socioeconomic statuses, and atti-
tudinal characteristics.
Scholarship on populism in Europe has argued
that supporters of populist parties have a number
of commonalities.
First, studies in Western Europe have found that
rightwing populist parties tend to attract supporters
with lower socioeconomic status, especially working-
class electorates, a phenomenon that became known in
the literature as “proletarization” of the populist right
vote (Arzheimer, 2013; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers,
2002; Oesch, 2008; Spies, 2013). In Central and Eastern
European contexts, however, the impact of individual
socioeconomic status on the support for these parties
is less straightforward. Some studies found that while
working-class constituencies in Hungary supported pop-
ulist right parties (Győri, 2015; Knutsen, 2013), in coun-
tries like the Czech Republic and Slovakia these groups
were more likely to associate with left-oriented parties
(Hloušek&Kopeček, 2008; Linek, 2015). This relationship
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between socioeconomic status and support for rightwing
populists might be conditioned by the economic posi-
tions of competing parties (Snegovaya, 2020).
In contrast to rightwing populists, the more inclu-
sive appeals of the technocrats should cut across class
lines, while their emphasis on the importance of exper-
tise and qualifications should appeal to more educated
voters. In line with this expectation, earlier studies have
demonstrated that unlike support for other Czech par-
ties, support for ANO is not predicted by ideology, policy
attitudes, or a specific social class (Havlík & Voda, 2018;
Maškarinec, 2017). Macron’s electoral base was found
to be disproportionately urban, financially well-off, and
well-educated (Chamorel, 2019).
I therefore expect rightwing parties to attract
working-class electorates, while technocratic parties
attract voters across class lines.
Second, studies of populism have identified that pop-
ulist voters tend to have lower levels of trust in estab-
lished parties and politicians. This stems from the nature
of the populist parties that politicize anti-elite sentiment
and attack political establishments by presenting them-
selves as defenders of ‘ordinary people’ (Mair, 2002;
Mudde, 2007). Studies have found that such ideological
appeals attract voters who are dissatisfied with political
establishments and have higher levels of political mis-
trust (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Oesch, 2008; Santana,
Zagórski, & Rama, 2020).
I therefore expect both types of populist parties to
attract voters with lower levels of political trust.
Third, populist voters also tend to be more
Eurosceptic, due to the anti-establishment nature of
such parties. Euroscepticism may be understood as an
‘anti-political establishment’ position (Schedler, 1996)
that affords populist parties an issue in which they might
cast themselves in opposition to the political class as a
whole (Harmsen, 2010). Populist parties often channel
the disaffection of their voters with mainstream politics
by questioning European integration and depicting the
European Union as a threat to the identity and nation-
hood of their respective societies. As a result, studies
have found that supporters of populist parties tend to be
Eurosceptic (Ramiro, 2016; Visser, Lubbers, Kraaykamp,
& Jaspers, 2014; Werts, Scheepers, & Lubbers, 2013).
I therefore expect both rightwing populists and
technocrats to attract voters with higher levels of
Euroscepticism.
Ultimately, in recent years, following the wave of
refugees that entered Europe in 2015, the anti-EU
sentiment has become closely linked to an opposi-
tion to immigration and open borders. The subse-
quent surge in support for populist right parties has
been linked to the growth in levels of immigration to
Europe (Grzymala-Busse, 2019; Norris & Inglehart, 2019,
p. 179). These anti-immigration views should be primari-
ly associated with support of rightwing populists whose
nativist stances mix well with rejection of immigration
(Allen, 2017; Arzheimer & Berning, 2019; Shehaj, Shin,
& Inglehart, 2019). While nativism is conceptually dis-
tinct from attitudes towards immigration, it is inher-
ently linked to the idea that immigrants represent a
“cultural threat” (Knoll, 2013), and has previously been
shown to have a significant effect on immigration atti-
tudes and immigration-related policy preferences (Citrin
& Sides, 2008).
I therefore expect anti-immigration stances to be
more pronounced among supporters of rightwing
populists.
While many papers have focused on the electorates
of rightwing populists, few have attempted to analyze
them in comparison to supporters of technocrats. In the
following sections, this article fills in this gap by focusing
on socioeconomic and attitudinal characteristics across
the electorates of parties led by Macron’s LaREM in
France and Babiš’s ANO 2011 in the Czech Republic, and
contrasts them to supporters of rightwing populist par-
ties FN and Dawn/SPD in their respective countries. First,
I focus on various sociodemographic indicators, like edu-
cation, income, and social class, that might predict sup-
port for these parties. Second, I focus on the attitudi-
nal preferences of these electorates, specifically analyz-
ing their levels of trust in political institutions (a proxy
for anti-establishment sentiment), Euroscepticism, and
anti-immigration attitudes, in comparison to supporters
of mainstream parties in respective countries.
5. Data and Analytical Procedure
For my analysis, I devised a study modeled after previ-
ous research (Allen, 2017; Rooduijn, 2018; Santana et al.,
2020). The analysis is set at the individual level and is
based on the data from the ESS, which is collected bien-
nially in 2014, 2016, and 2018, when data on parties in
their respective countries is available.
The dependent variable is based on the ESS ques-
tion: “Which party did you vote for in the last election?”
I recoded this variable so that a respondent scores a “1”
if they voted for one of the analyzed parties, and a “0” if
they voted for one of the mainstream parties in the par-
liament at the time of the survey. If a respondent voted
for another party, this variable was set to missing.
All regressions include a number of sociodemo-
graphic variables: sex, age, quadratic age term, edu-
cation (primary—base category, secondary and ter-
tiary), household’s net income, and unemployment sta-
tus. To control for respondents’ occupational status,
I used the commonly-employed Erikson-Goldthorpe-
Portocarero classification schema, which transforms the
ISCO-88 codes into the following categories: 1) “higher-
grade professionals”; 2) “lower-grade professionals”;
3) “routine non-manual employees in administration
and commerce, sales personnel, other rank—and file—
employees”; 4) “small proprietors including farmers and
smallholders”; 5) “skilled manual workers and manual
supervisors”; 6) “semi- and unskilled manual workers”
(Erikson, Goldthorpe, & Portocarero, 1979; Hendrickx,
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2002). The “higher-grade professionals” were chosen as
the base category.
The level of political mistrust, which is commonly
used in the literature as a proxy for anti-establishment
sentiment (Santana et al., 2020), was measured based
on three correlated (0–10 scale) standardized variables
that asked about respondents’ levels of trust in polit-
ical parties, politicians, and a country’s parliament
(Cronbach’s 𝛼 = 0.74). The lower value of the coefficient
of this variable corresponds to lower levels of institution-
al trust.
Euroscepticism is measured using the ESS 11-points
question about whether European unification has
already gone too far (0) or should go further (10). The
negative coefficient of this variable indicates higher lev-
els of Euroscepticism.
To control for immigration attitudes, I performed a
factor analysis of three highly-correlated (0–10 scale)
standardized variables that asked about respondents’
attitudes toward immigrants (Cronbach’s 𝛼 = 0.87).
The questions asked to assess whether immigrants are
bad (0) or good (10) for the economy, undermine (0) or
enrich (10) culture, or generally make the respondent’s
country “worse” (0) or “better” (10).
Because of the binary nature of the dependent vari-
able, I ran probit models controlling for a linear year
trend to account for time-level variation. The obser-
vations were weighted using the ESS design weights
to correct for the fact that respondents in different
countries have different probabilities of being sampled.
Observations with missing values were deleted.
While the data on ANO, Dawn/SPD, and FN is avail-
able for 2014, 2016, and 2018, Macron’s LaREM party
was absent before 2017.
Instead of a pooled analysis, I analyzed the elec-
torates of all of the selected parties separately. The
reason I chose to run separate regressions for each
selected party is that the effects discovered from a
pooled analysis may confound important variation on
the country-level and overestimate the effects of the vari-
ables of interest.
6. Findings
For the sake of my analysis, the size of the effects is less
important than their sign and significance. Hence the
below Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of the direc-
tion of the regression coefficients and show whether
they are positive or negative. Marginal effects are pro-
vided in the Supplementary File, Appendix II.
Table 1 focuses on the electorates of rightwing pop-
ulist parties Dawn/SPD in the Czech Republic and the
FN in France in comparison to supporters of mainstream
parties in parliament at the time of the analysis. The
Dawn of Direct Democracy party fell apart in May 2015,
when a number of MPs split from it and founded a new
party (SPD). Both parties attract similar type of support-
ers (Kaniok & Hloušek, 2018). To preserve a higher num-
ber of observations, I analyzed supporters of the Czech
parties Dawn and SPD together. Columns (1) and (3)
include basic sociodemographic controls, while columns
(2) and (4) add in the analysis attitudinal characteristics
of their voters.
Overall, the findings in Table 1 go in line with the
expectations and previous literature on this topic. First, in
terms of their socioeconomic status (columns (1) and (3)
in Table 1), supporters of rightwing populists tend to be
working class (in case of FN) and low controllers’ status
(in case of Dawn/SPD). This is consistent with the liter-
ature which found that while in the Western European
context there is a strong link between working-class sta-
tus and rightwing populist vote, in Central and Eastern
Europe this association is less straightforward. There
is also a consistent negative association between age
and support for right populist parties, suggesting that
younger voters are more likely to vote for such parties.
Second, based on the coefficients in Table 1
(columns (2) and (4)), supporters of rightwing pop-
ulist parties in both countries have significantly lower
levels of trust in political institutions, and higher lev-
els of Euroscepticism and anti-immigration sentiment.
Marginal effects (Table 4 in the Supplementary File,
Appendix II) suggest that the size of the effect is larg-
er for the immigration variable, which is consistent with
the emphasis these parties make on nativism. This goes
in linewith earlier studies that have identified these char-
acteristics as distinguishing the electorates of rightwing
populists from voters of other parties. In other words,
rightwing populists constitute a coherent party fami-
ly which unites parties that are ideologically close and
attracts similar types of supporters.
Next, I repeat this analysis by focusing on parties led
by technocratic leaders in respective countries. Table 2
focuses on voters of ANO and LaREM in comparison to
supporters of other mainstream parties in parliament
at the time of the survey. Columns (1) and (3) include
respondents’ basic sociodemographic controls, while
columns (2) and (4) add their attitudinal characteristics.
First, in terms of their socioeconomic status
(columns (1) and (3) in Table 2), supporters of ANO and
LaREM do not seem to have many characteristics in com-
mon and do not differmuch from the electorates ofmain-
streamparties. Here, the effect of education is not consis-
tent (the effects of the education variable disappear after
the inclusion of attitudinal variables). Overall, the results
are somewhat in line with the original expectations—
technocratic populists cut across class lines and appeal
to voters belonging to various socioeconomic groups.
Second, in terms of their attitudinal characteristics
(columns (2) and (4) in Table 2), the results also do not
confirm the expectations. The only variable whose coeffi-
cient is consistent across ANO and LaREM is institutional
trust, but the sign of the coefficient goes in the direction
opposite to the expectations—the supporters of these
parties have higher levels of trust in political institutions
as compared to voters of mainstream parties. One pos-
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Table 1. Probit regression model explaining voting for rightwing populist parties (mainstream parties in parliament as
base category).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dawn/SPD Dawn/SPD FN FN
Male 0.125 0.223*** −0.285*** −0.187
(0.096) (0.107) (0.146) (0.165)
Age −0.009*** −0.014*** −0.024*** −0.033***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Unemployed 0.200 0.178 −0.707 −0.550
(0.260) (0.286) (0.605) (0.615)
Income −0.052 −0.079*** −0.056 −0.080
(0.042) (0.044) (0.080) (0.090)
Education:
Secondary 0.431*** 0.488*** −0.153 0.040
(0.223) (0.239) (0.185) (0.207)
Tertiary 0.211 0.322 −0.942*** −0.581***
(0.244) (0.260) (0.258) (0.287)
Socio-economic status:
Low controllers 0.311*** 0.429*** 0.414 0.427
(0.155) (0.178) (0.311) (0.398)
Routine nonmanual 0.048 0.170 0.288 0.388
(0.163) (0.186) (0.335) (0.407)
Self-employed 0.150 0.249 0.749*** 0.376
(0.186) (0.207) (0.349) (0.477)
Skilled manual 0.012 −0.005 0.836*** 0.766***
(0.177) (0.207) (0.355) (0.441)
Semi-unskilled manual 0.115 0.130 0.702*** 0.475
(0.164) (0.191) (0.321) (0.391)
Trust in institutions −0.171*** −0.233***
(0.056) (0.113)




ESS round 0.097*** 0.104***
(0.052) (0.058)
Constant −2.426*** −2.417*** 0.375 0.875
(0.525) (0.596) (0.464) (0.553)
Observations 3,325 3,048 777 737
r2_p 0.0291 0.102 0.158 0.377
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
sible explanation is that both ANO and LaREM were in
power at the time of the study, and hence higher lev-
els of institutional trust may reflect their voters’ satis-
faction with the political institutions that allowed these
parties to win (Petrova & Snegovaya, 2020). However,
this result contradicts the original expectation, as well
as the essence of populist ideology, which tends to
mobilize voters through anti-elitist messages (Hameleers
et al., 2018).
In reference to Euroscepticism and anti-immigration
attitudes, the results are also not consistent across both
parties. While ANO, as expected, tends to attract more
Eurosceptic voters than other parties, supporters of
LaREM do not differ from mainstream parties on their
levels of Euroscepticism. Additionally, Macron’s voters
tend to be more oriented in favor of immigration, while
Babiš’ voters do not differ on this issue from voters of
other parties.
Overall, these findings demonstrate that while sup-
porters of the rightwing populist parties tend to have
similar attitudinal preferences, voters of parties led
by technocratic leaders represent quite different social
groups, especially in relation to their socioeconomic sta-
tus and attitudinal characteristics. Supporters of these
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Table 2. Probit regression model explaining voting for technocratic parties (mainstream parties in parliament as base
category).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ANO ANO LaREM LaREM
Male −0.051 −0.052 0.164 0.158
(0.056) (0.058) (0.115) (0.122)
Age −0.005*** −0.005*** 0.005 0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Unemployed −0.424*** −0.417*** −0.316 −0.377
(0.208) (0.219) (0.389) (0.391)
Income 0.045*** 0.045 0.052 0.025
(0.026) (0.028) (0.069) (0.074)
Education:
Secondary 0.229*** 0.193 0.065 0.038
(0.113) (0.120) (0.173) (0.189)
Tertiary 0.172 0.171 0.399*** 0.198
(0.124) (0.130) (0.194) (0.210)
Socio-economic status:
Low controllers 0.021 −0.019 −0.207 −0.181
(0.088) (0.091) (0.163) (0.167)
Routine nonmanual 0.036 0.035 −0.340*** −0.395***
(0.092) (0.096) (0.199) (0.204)
Self-employed −0.011 −0.082 −0.378 −0.413
(0.114) (0.121) (0.254) (0.269)
Skilled manual 0.077 0.063 −0.246 −0.190
(0.098) (0.103) (0.296) (0.311)
Semi-unskilled manual −0.057 −0.045 −0.582*** −0.609***
(0.096) (0.100) (0.229) (0.239)
Trust in institutions 0.088*** 0.238***
(0.031) (0.079)




ESS round 0.065*** 0.049
(0.031) (0.033)
Constant −1.039*** −0.816*** −0.896*** −1.078***
(0.313) (0.336) (0.389) (0.422)
Observations 3,179 2,917 680 644
r2_p 0.0103 0.0118 0.0500 0.0988
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
parties vary dramatically in terms of their stances on
Euroscepticism, and, contrary to expectation, show high-
er levels of trust in political institutions than voters of oth-
er mainstream parties. This last finding should be inter-
preted as a warning against theorizing the technocratic
populist parties as a distinct theoretical concept, as this
contradicts the core of populism—its anti-elitist message.
7. Discussion and Conclusion
In this article, I have looked at two types of politi-
cal actors who are commonly described as ‘populist’
in literature—namely, rightwing populists and techno-
cratic leaders. I have analyzed similarities and differ-
ences in the platforms of these leaders and their respec-
tive parties. In addition, I have empirically compared
the electorates of parties led by technocratic leaders—
Emmanuel Macron’s Republic en Marche in France and
Andrej Babiš’s ANO 2011 in the Czech Republic against
the electorates of rightwing populists in their respec-
tive countries, namely, the FN led by Marine Le Pen and
Dawn/SPD led by Tomio Okamura.
While both types of political actors tend to emerge
in response to a decline in trust in established parties
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and adopt platforms with anti-establishment andmonist
elements, they are also quite different. In contrast to
rightwing populists, technocrats deliberately adopt an
‘ideological vagueness’ that allows them more flexibility
in choosing policies which ensure voter support and use
a more inclusive notion of ‘the people.’
While dissatisfied with established parties, support-
ers of rightwing populist and technocratic parties rep-
resent different social groups, especially in relation to
their socioeconomic status and attitudinal character-
istics. The rightwing populist parties (Dawn/SPD and
National Front) tend to attract voters with lower levels
of political trust, higher levels of Euroscepticism, and
stronger anti-immigration preferences. These findings
are consistent with existing literature on rightwing pop-
ulists that has identified commonalities across these par-
ties’ electorates (Allen, 2017; Rooduijn, 2018; Santana
et al., 2020). A distinct ideological profile coupled with
specific social groups receptive to their narratives allows
us to identify rightwing populist parties as an analytically
distinct party family.
By contrast, the empirical analysis of Macron’s
LaREM and Babiš’ ANO parties shows that while cut-
ting across class lines, their supporters have few com-
monalities in their attitudinal characteristics. These par-
ties’ electorates vary in terms of their stances on
Euroscepticism and immigration attitudes. These results
generally are backed by earlier studies which found that,
for example, support for ANO is not predicted by spe-
cific ideology, policy attitudes, or a social class catego-
ry (Havlík & Voda, 2018; Maškarinec, 2017). The hetero-
geneity of their electorates is, at least, in part driven
by the ideologic ambiguity of these parties and leaders,
which allows them to attract diverse support.
In addition, contrary to previous expectations, I find
that voters of LaREM and ANO have higher levels of trust
in political institutions than voters of other mainstream
parties. This finding is at odds with the heart of pop-
ulist ideology, which tends to mobilize voters through
anti-elitist appeals (Hameleers et al., 2018). Overall,
these results cast doubts on arguments for classifying
ANO and LaREM together into a distinct party family
(Havlík & Voda, 2018; Maškarinec, 2017).
While the rise of parties combining anti-establish-
ment and monist appeals with an emphasis on tech-
nocratic governance can be attributed to a decline in
trust in established party elites and rising corruption
concerns, it is less clear to what extent these parties
can be grouped into one analytical category. These
parties adopt populist narratives in response to a per-
ceived crisis of representation in their respective poli-
ties, but it is questionable whether they constitute one
distinct ideological group of political actors. The rela-
tively small number of such parties, the lack of a dis-
tinct ideological profile, and the variation of their sup-
port groups suggests that one should use caution when
conceptualizing technocratic parties as a distinct theoret-
ical type.
Scholars who have recognized this problem some-
times offer discourse, rather than ideology, as evidence
for classification of ‘technocratic populists’ into a distinct
party family. For example, Bickerton and Accetti (2018)
argue, using the example of the Five Star Movement
and Podemos, that these parties employ a unique
type of rhetorical appeals which mix ‘anti-system,’ ‘anti-
establishment,’ and ‘populist’ elements with ‘techno-
cratic’ themes. Other studies, however, have shown
that in recent years the number of various political
actors (not just those usually labeled as populist) using
anti-establishment rhetoric has increased dramatically in
many European countries (Engler et al., 2019). Because
of this, rhetorical appeals alone may not be sufficient
to uniquely distinguish these parties as a separate fam-
ily. In-depth quantitative analysis of their electoral plat-
forms is needed to confirm that rhetorical appeals of
technocratic parties and leaders are indeed distinctly dif-
ferent from those of other political actors.
There are several limitations of this study that should
be acknowledged. First, the analysis in this article is lim-
ited to 2018, the last year for which ESS data is available.
However, in recent years, Babiš and his party ANO have
moved more to the left on economic policy to attract
new segments of the electorate (including older peo-
ple and pensioners) through targeted welfare policies.
Future studies, therefore, may find that ANO support is
more strongly associated with lower socioeconomic sta-
tus, a fact which might render its voters’ profiles closer
to that of rightwing populists.
Second, the data availability has also limited the num-
ber of parties that could be included in the analysis.
Ideally, future studies should expand the analysis to other
technocratic leaders and parties, such as Silvio Berlusconi
in Italy, Donald Trump in the United States, Bidzina
Ivanishvili in Georgia, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador.
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